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H
INJUNCTIONS OF STATE SUITS IN FEDERAL INTERPLEADER
MAY a United States court in an interpleader proceeding enjoin
pending state suits brought by any of the claimants against the
stakeholder? Inability to grant such relief will not destroy federal
jurisdiction over the interpleader bill,' but, if only future state suits
can be enjoined, it will greatly limit the capacity of the United States
court to wind up the controversy and accomplish complete justice.
A. Injunctions Apart from the Federal Interpleader Legislation
In cases outside the federal interpleader legislation, the stakeholder
necessarily faces the obstacle presented by Section 265 of the Judicial
Code: 2
"The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United
States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where
such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in
bankruptcy."
An occasional case of ancillary interpleader like Marine Midland
Trust Company v. Irving Trust Company 3 may fall within the bank-
ruptcy exception, but in most situations the stakeholder will be
t Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. The first portion of this article
appeared in (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1134.
1. Lowther v. New York Life Insurance Co., 278 Fed. 405 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
2. 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1926). This is derived from Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22
§ 5, 1 STAT. 334, and R. S. § 720, so that the prohibition has affected every re-
ported federal interpleader case apart from the Interpleader Acts. On the gen-
eral operation of this statute and the judicial exceptions to it, see Warren, Fed-
eral and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAnv. L. REv. 345; Notes (1923) 36
HARV. L. REv. 461; (1930) 8 Tux. L. REv. 592; (1923) 24 A. L. 1. 1084.
3. 56 F. (2d) 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1932), aff'd. sub vorn. Marine Midland Trust
Co. v. Eybro, 58 F. (2d) 165 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); see also earlier proceedings in
Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Trust Co., 47 F. (2d) 907 (S. D. N. Y. 1931).
A state suit by one claimant was enjoined, but it is doubtful whether the ancillary
interpleader bills were really proceedings in bankruptcy. The facts are stated
in Chafee, infra note 4, at 1157.
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denied an injunction unless he can bring himself within one of the
additional exceptions which have been built up by judicial decisions.
The most important group of such exceptions allows an injunction
against state suits which interfere with the satisfactory operation
of the federal proceeding. For example, state litigation will not be
allowed to hamper the federal administration of property in the cus-
tody of a United States court. A few federal interpleader suits are
of such a possessory nature.4 Interpleader, however, usually involves
a debt or other obligation, which cannot properly be considered a
res in the custody of the equity court.5
When a federal suit is in personam, the mere fact that a state
suit is running concurrently does not take the case out of Section
265. 6 Suppose the same plaintiff brings a federal suit based on di-
versity of citizenship, and a later parallel state suit which for some
reason cannot be removed. No ground for enjoining the state suit
is here presented. Diversity of citizenship does not confer a right
to federal adjudication of the controversy of which the defendant
ought not to be deprived by the state suit,7 but only a statutory right,
which Congress who created it can limit and has apparently limited
here by expressly denying the remedies of removal and injunction.
And there is no serious interference with the federal suit when the
chief effect of the duplication is just a race for judgment. Although
the federal court heard the dispute first, the state court is usually
as capable of settling it adequately. In whichever court judgment
4. See cases cited in Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 1134, notes 45, 47. In none of these is an injunction mentioned.
5. Id. notes 4, 53; see also American Exchange Bank v. Palmer, 256 Fed,
680 (S. D. N. Y. 1919); Ackerman v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927).
The contrary is suggested, but not decided, by both courts in Sherman National
Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), aff'g 238 Fed.
225 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
6. Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U. S. 226 (1922). The comment in
(1923) 36 HAnv. L. Rnv. 461 is abstracted in the text.
7. This reasoning may not apply to cases where the United States court
takes jurisdiction over a bill of interpleader because it involves a controversy
"under the laws of the United States." See cases in Chafee, supra note 4,
1139, 1140. The stakeholder may possibly have a constitutional right to a federal
adjudication of this federal question, which ought to be protected by injunction.
The Note cited supra note 6 says that this problem is left undecided by Kline
v. Burke Construction Co. The possibility of the injunction seems best in
cases where Congress has given the United States courts exclusive jurisdiction
of the federal question; the pending state suit is then without jurisdiction and
might well be stayed as purely vexatious. However, it is arguable that even
the jurisdiction of the United States courts over federal questions can be with-
drawn by Congress, so that under the- reasoning of the Kline case there is no
constitutional right involved.
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is fi-st obtained, it can then be set up so as to end the other suit
at once by the principle of res adijudicata. Consequently, the defend-
ant does not badly need an injunction.
Despite what has just been said, the federal interpleader suit, fol-
lowed by a state action at law between only one claimant and the
stakeholder, presents an altogether different situation where the inter-
ference with the federal proceeding is far greater. Here, the state
suit is not really parallel to the federal suit; it is much more limited
in its scope than the interpleader and much less capable of achieving
justice. And there is here no even race for judgment. Everything
depends on ending the entire interpleader suit, especially the second
stage, before the state suit reaches judgment. For if the state suit
moves faster and is lost by the stakeholder, he will have to satisfy
the judgment without being able to set it up as res ad judicata so as to
extinguish the demand of the other claimant. The latter may be
awarded the money deposited in the interpleader by the stakeholder,
who will then have paid the debt twice. Even if it is possible for him
to enjoin the state judgment, on the ground that section 265 does
not apply to judgments inequitably obtained," this is a clumsy solu-
tion. It would be much better to stop the state litigation in its
earlier stages, leaving the United States court free to handle the
entire controversy, which the state court cannot.
When the federal interpleader is by original bill, the present state
of the authorities indicates that the foregoing arguments for enjoin-
ing pending state suits will not prevail. Several decisions can be
cited to the effect that Section 265 applies.9 Probably the most that
can be accomplished without express legislative authorization is to
enjoin pending federal suits0 and threatened state suits. Perhaps
under favorable conditions use can be made of the ingenious plan
adopted in one of the earliest federal cases, City Bank v. Skelton."
A New York bank held for safekeeping securities and cash from a
8. Simon v. Southern Ry Co., 236 U. S. 115 (1915). Many cases hold that
judgment against a stakeholder on one claim bars interpleader. 2 AmEs, CASES
oN EQurrY (1904) 49 n.
9. City Bank v. Skelton, 2 Blatch. 14, 26 (S. D. N. Y. 1846); McWhirter v.
Halsted, 24 Fed. 828 (C. C. N. J. 1885); Federal Mining Co. v. Bunlier Hill
Mining Co., 187 Fed. 474 (C. C. Idaho 1909); Lowther v. New York Life In-
surance Co., supra note 1. And see the dictum of Learned Hand, J., as to
original bills, quoted infra, at note 13.
10. City Bank v. Skelton, McWhirter v. Halsted, both supra note 9. See also
the cases cited infra, note 12.
11. Supra, note 9. Nothing was said to show that the interpleader was
ancillary, or that the cash and securities constituted a res in the custody of
the federal court. The federal actions at law were not directed toward con-
ferring such custody. There was complete diversity of citizenship.
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decedent's estate. Two foreign legatees sued the bank and an exe-
cutor in the New York Chancery court. The bank answered, dis-
claiming interest in the deposit and offering to put it into court. Next,
the executor, a Virginian, began federal actions at law against the
bank, which brought federal interpleader. Because of his inability
to enjoin the state suits, Judge Betts refused to compel interpleader
but suggested two equivalent remedies in the alternative. First, he
refused to let the executor press his federal actions at law so long as
he could settle his dispute with the legatees in the state equity court,
where the bank had virtually interpleaded. Secondly, he gave all
parties the option of consenting by stipulation to interplead in the
United States court and thus place the entire controversy under its
control. An ancillary federal interpleader, on the other hand, will
probably be protected from interference by pending state suits, at
least if the main federal suit preceded them. This was decided by
the appellate courts in two circuits.12  In the Shubert case Judge
Hand said :13
"As to enjoining any suits in the state courts, the question is not free from
doubt, yet I think that, if the federal jurisdiction first attach, as here,
section 265 ... does not apply. The case is quite different if the jurisdic-
tion of this court first arise from the bill of interpleader itself. If, however,
as I have said, the jurisdiction in the interpleader be ancillary, and depend
upon a more liberal interpretation of 'the matter in controversy,' obviously
it would be absurd to hold that the very purpose of the bill might be
defeated through section 265. It may be urged that the bill would lie in
the state court as well, and perhaps it might; but, to say the least, the
efficacy of such a bill to restrain the action at law already pending in this
court is doubtful. I do not rely so much on dicta . . . , as upon the well-
settled rule in possessory suits and its applicability here, if once it be
assumed that the 'controversy' may include the determination of the actual
obligee."
This is very helpful so far as it goes, but it does not take care
of original bills and possibly not of ancillary bills when the state
suits began before the main federal suit. The obstacle to complete
relief in such situations could easily be removed by Congress, so as
to permit injunctions in interpleader as in bankruptcy. This, Con-
gress has already done when the injunctions against pending state
suits are sought in proceedings under the present Interpleader Act.
12. Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., supra note 5; Flem-
ing v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 40 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), crt. don.
282 U. S. 869. The decision in the Shubert case was followed in the Marine
Midland Trust Co. case, supra note 3; this was possibly a bankruptcy proceed-
ing within the express exception in § 265.
13. Supra, note 5 in 238 Fed. 225, at 230.
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B. Injunctions under the Federal Interpleader Acts
Although the Interpleader Act of 1917 did not expressly authorize
injunctions against state suits, it would have been natural to construe
the new jurisdiction conferred upon the district courts as carrying
with it the ability to do what other equity courts have always done
in interpleader proceedings, especially since the Act did give power
to make "suitable and proper" orders and decrees, and to issue "the
necessary writs usual and customary in such cases." However, the
only decision on the point 14 applied Section 265, so that a definite
provision on injunctions was needed. Such a clause was inadvertent-
ly omitted from the 1925 Act, but incorporated in the 1926 Act. When
an interpleader falls within this statute, the district court can enjoin
any conflicting suit, future or pending, state or federal. 13
It is to be hoped that Congress -will eventually modify the effect
of Section 265 still further, so as to make it plain in interpleader
(even outside the scope of the 1926 Act) as it is now plain in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, that the federal court after properly taking jur-
isdiction can settle the whole controversy without interference from
state litigation.
In
INTERPLEADER IN A FEDERAL ACTION AT LAW
We turn now to the internal aspects of federal interpleader. The
next problem concerns the relations between the law and equity sides
of a United States court. Suppose a stakeholder, against whom an
action at law is pending in that court, can interplead there in equity
under the Act of 1926 or otherwise. The jurisdictional requisites
are satisfied and all the claimants can be personally served. An
original or ancillary bill would lie, but is it necessary to go to so much
trouble? It is much quicker and simpler if the stakeholder can ask
interpleader as part of his defense, bring in the other claimant as
a new party, and force him to settle his dispute with the plaintiff,
all in the original law action. We have already seen that when the
initial federal suit against the stakeholder is in equity, he is pos-
sibly able to interplead in that same suit through a counterclaim in
14. Lowther v. New York Life Insurance Co., supre note 1.
15. See the last part of § 2 of the Act, quoted Chafee supra note 4, at 1163.
This has been judicially construed in Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. A. S. Reid &
Co., 16 F. (2d) 502 (E. D. Pa. 1926); Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adam-
son, 24 F. (2d) 107, 712 (N. D. Tex. 1928) ; Ross v. International Life Insurance
Co., 24 F. (2d) 345 (C. C. A. 6th, 1928); National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders,
38 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930), rev'g 33 F. (2d) 157.
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his answer under Federal Equity Rule 30-despite judicial state-
ments to the contrary.10 A similar expeditious procedure is per-
mitted in an action at law by statute in England and most states
and also under the federal Bills of Lading Act.'- Is it available on
the law side of the United States .courts (apart from suits involving
bills of lading) ? Statutory authorization for such a practice, if it
be permissible at all, must be found either in the Conformity Act
or in Section 274 (b) of the Judicial Code.
A. Under State Statutes and the Conformity Act
The federal Conformity Act says that the practice in civil causes in
a district court, except equity and admiralty causes, shall conform,
as near as may be, to the practice existing at the time in like causes
in the courts of the state where the district lies."' This statute was
enacted in 1872 to protect litigants, whose legal advisers had been
trained under the local code of procedure or practice act. If the
remedy furnished by one of these interpleader statutes is not equit-
able in nature, then the Conformity Act makes it apply on the law
side of the United States courts sitting in the state. A United States
judge brought up in a state where interpleader in contract and con-
version actions is an everyday matter might easily go ahead without
any question and grant a motion for substitution of the outside claim-
ant in a federal action at law. There are several cases of this sort.19
It is natural that the majority of these were in Pennsylvania, when
interpleader was used in common law actions even before any statute
was passed. 20
However, other decisions 2' take a sounder view in refusing to ex-
tend the interpleader procedure allowed by these state statutes to
16. Chafee, supra note 4, notes 83, 84.
17. The statutes are collected in MACLENNAN, INTERPLPADER (1901) 345 ff.
For the Bills of Lading Act, see 39 STAT. 541 (1916), 49 U. S. C. § 97 (1929).
18. 17 STAT. 197 (1872), 28 U. S. C. § 724 (1926). See Note (1922) 35
HARv. L. Rnv. 602.
19. N. Y.: Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 Fed. 195 (S.
D., N. Y. 1917), rev'd in 250 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918). Okla.: See Brown
v. Home Life Insurance Co., 3 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. Okla. 1925). Pa.: Caton v.
Eagle Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 177 Fed. 996 (W. D. Pa. 1909); Huxley v. Pennsyl-
vania Warehousing & S. D. Co., 184 Fed. 705 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); Montgomery
v. Philadelphia, 253 Fed. 473 (E. D. Pa. 1918). See also Matthews, J., Krlp-
pendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 287 (1884).
20. Brownfield v. Canon, 25 Pa. 299, 301 (1855); Russell v. Church, 65 Pa.
9, 14 (1870).
21. Cal.: Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Miner, 25 Fed. 533 (C. C. Cal. 1885). N. Y.:
Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Trust Co., supra note 3. N. a.: Lockett
v. Rumbough, 40 Fed. 523 (C. C. N. C. 1889). See also United States v. U. S.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 247 Fed. 16, 20 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
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actions at law in the United States courts. The Conformity Act does
not apply to state statutes injecting equitable issues into actions at
law, for equitable proceedings are governed by another federal statute,
which declares that "the forms and modes of proceeding in suits of
equity . . . shall be according to the principles, rules, and usages
which belong to courts of equity" unless it is otherwise provided
by Acts of Congress or by Federal Equity Rules duly made by
the Supreme Court.2 2 The federal courts have insisted that their
barrier between law and equity must not be undermined by state
legislation.m For example, they have refused to apply the Conformity
Act to statutes allowing equitable defenses or cross bills against the
plaintiff in actions at law.2 4 Interpleader is even farther afield be-
cause it brings in new parties; and multiple party suits, which before
the adoption of the United States Constitution, were handled by
Chancery and not by the common law courts. Thus a United States
court in Ohio refused to allow representatives of a class to intervene in
an action at law for money although such intervention was permitted
by the Ohio code.25 The state interpleader statutes purport to regulate
actions at law, but they do so by bringing into such an action a suit
in equity with new parties. The state courts themselves have con-
sidered that interpleader by a defendant at law is an equitable pro-
ceeding which does not require a jury trial.2 0  The Supreme Court in
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Banik 2 T appears to take a similar
view. Therefore a stakeholder who wishes to interplead in the pend-
ing federal lawsuit cannot safely rely upon legislation in the particular
state, but must look for the necessary statutory authorization to fed-
eral legislation regulating equitable procedure.
22. 1 STAT. 93 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 723 (1926).
23. McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States Courts
(1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 283-7; Pound, infra, note 28.
24. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 512 (1892); Montejo v. Owen, 14
Blatchf. 324 (C. C. N. Y. 1877); Jewett Car Co. v. Kirkpatrick Construction Co.,
107 Fed. 622 (C. C. Ind. 1901).
25. McKemy v. Supreme Lodge A. 0. U. W., 180 Fed. 961 (C. C. A. 6th,
1910).
26. McDonald v. McDonald, 212 Ala. 137, 139, 140 (1924); Clark v. Mosher,
107 N. Y. 118, 121 (1887). Some state courts seem contra; e.g., Pennsylvania. See
Pennsylvania cases cited by MAcLENNAN, INTERPLEADEn 187. This is significant
as explaining the federal decisions in Pennsylvania, supra note 19.
27. Infra, note 36. Although this case turned on Judicial Code § 274 (b),
much of the reasoning as to the equitable nature of interpleader would apply
to a proceeding under state legislation. The record and briefs indicate that
some reliance was placed by the district court on the provision in the Kansas
code allowing interpleader in actions at law.
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B. Under Section 274 (b) of the Judicial Code
The necessary Congressional authorization for interpleader in actions
at law may be provided by section 274 (b) of the Judicial Code, added
in 1915:28
"In all actions at law equitable defenses may be interposed by answer,
plea, or replication without the necessity of filing a bill on the equity side
of the court. The defendant shall have the same rights in such case as if
he had filed a bill embodying the defense or seeking the relief prayed for
in such answer or plea. Equitable relief respecting the subject matter of
the suit may thus be obtained by answer or plea. In case Affirmative relief
is prayed in such answer or plea, the plaintiff shall file a replication." . . .
Since interpleader is a defensive remedy, it is reasonable to include
it among the "equitable defenses" which can now be raised by answer.
True, it is more than a defense, for besides defeating the claimants'
actions at law it also seeks affirmative relief against the claimants by
injunction and otherwise. But affirmative relief is inferentially sanc-
tioned by the second and fourth sentences of section 274 (b), and the
statute has been interpreted to permit a defendant to obtain by answer
reformation for mistake, cancellation, and injunctions against torts."O
A more serious difficulty is that in interpleader affirmative relief is
not directed against the law plaintiff alone, as in the situations just
mentioned; it is also directed against the outside claimant. For this
reason Judge Ward in the Shubert case refused to allow interpleader
by answer under section 274 (b) : 30
28. Act, March 3, 1915, 38 STAT. 956, 28 U. S. C. § 398 (1926). SC note
(1923) 36 HARv. L. Rav. 474.
This section formed part of the "Law and Equity Bill" drafted by the American
Bar Association Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and Formulate Pro-
posed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, of which
Everett P. Wheeler was chairman. (1911) 36 REP. A. B. A. 448, 459, 468, 470.
The report of the subcommittee on Law and Equity in the Federal Courts does
not mention interpleader. (This report, written by Pound, a member of the
committee, is reprinted in (1911) 73 CENT. L. J. 204.) Section 274 (b) was orig-
inally introduced in 1912, in the Senate by Elihu Root of New York, in the
House by Henry D. Clayton of Alabama; and eventually became law almost
exactly as drafted by the Bar Association committee. For other references in
REP. A. B. A., see (1908) 33:90; (1909) 34:491; (1910) 35:59, 66, 642; (1912)
37:558, 563; (1913) 38:548, 571; (1914) 39:577, 587, 588; (1915) 40: 510, 513.
29. Upson Nut Co. v. American Shipbuilding Co., 251 Fed. 707 (N. D. Ohio
1918); Royal Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lloyd, 254 Fed. 407 (C. C. A.
8th, 1918); United Timber Corporation v. Bivens, 248 Fed. 554, 563 (1. D. S. C.
1918). Affirmative relief by replication is less certain. See Note (1922) 83
HAnv. L. Rav. 345.
30. Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256, at 260.
Accord: Breitung v. Packard, 260 Fed. 895 (D. Mass. 1919); Marine Midland
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"We construe this section as contemplating relief between the original
parties. The earlier language is expressly restricted to defenses and the
subsequent provision as to affirmative relief should be read as relief against
the complainant only, so that in an action at law the defendant may have
the same relief he can in a suit in equity under equity rule 30, viz. an
affirmative judgment against the complainant by counterclaim in the answer,
instead of having to file a cross-bill as the old practice required."
Aside from the fact that the 1925 amendment to Equity Rule 30,
allowing new parties to be brought in by answer,3' supersedes part
of Judge Ward's reasoning, Section 274 (b) ought not to be construed
so literally as all this. Nothing in this statute forbids interpleader
or joining new parties, and such relief would further the purpose for
which the American Bar Association established the committee that
drafted this law-"to prevent delay and unnecessary cost in litiga-
tion." These draftsmen wrote:8-
"There is no magic in these particular symbols ['at law' or 'in equity'].
No one of them is a shibboleth or a fetish. The court is a unit. There can
be no possible reason why the judge, who today sits in the jury term, to-
morrow holds the equity term, and on the third day holds the admiralty
term, should not have full power in either division to administer justice
upon the merits."
Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 385 (S. D. N. Y. 1932). The question
was left open by Judge Learned Hand below, in the Sherman National Bank
case, 238 Fed. 225, 228; and by U. S. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., cupra
note 21. Cf. Williams v. Mason, 7 F. (2d) 143 (S. D. Fla. 1925) (equitable
replication cannot bring in new parties).
31. Chafee, supra note 4, note 84.
32. (1911) 36 REP. A. B. A. 460; see supra note 28.
In a companion report by the same committee, on Principles of Practice Re-
form, the following statement was made (1910, 35 REP. A. B. A. 642): "The
Equitable Principle of Complete Disposition of the Entire Controversy botween
the Parties should be extended to its Full Extent and Applied to Every Type
of Proceeding. To give effect to this principle, four propositions may be sug-
gested: (1) The courts should have power and it should be their duty in every
sort of cause or proceeding to grant any relief or allow any defense or cross-
demand which the facts shown and the substantive law may require. (2) No
cause or proceeding should fail or be dismissed for want of necessary parties
or for non-joinder of parties, but provision should be made to bring them in.
(3)Joinder of all parties proper to a complete disposition of the entire con-
troversy should be allowed in every sort of cause, and at every stage thereof,
even though they are not all interested in the entire controversy. (4) Courts
should have power in all proceedings to render such judgment against such
parties before it as the case made requires in point of substantive law, to render
different judgments against different parties or in favor of some and against
others, whether on the same side of the cause or not, and to dismiss some and
grant relief to or against others, imposing costs in ease of misjoinder or un-
necessary joinder upon the party or parties responsible therefor."
1932]
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It is in this broad spirit that the statute has been judicially con-
strued in other connections. Section 274 (b) is a grant of procedural
power to United States judges to enable them to accomplish justice
more readily, and not a series of minute regulations. Indeed, the
statute is not precise on details, which must in any event be worked
out by the courts. Thus Mr. Justice Holmes said: 3-
"So far as the policy of Congress might permit, we should be disposed to
be a little astute to save a party's rights from being lost through mistakes
apon a technical matter in the somewhat confused condition of the statutes."
Judge Learned Hand observed :34
"I agree that the language of the section is not what a Mitford or a Lang-
dell would have used; but the purpose seems to me perfectly plain, and we
ought, I think, to try to effect it if we can."
Judge Clayton, who introduced the bill in the House, thus wrote
of it: 35
"The paramount idea carried in the act is that courts are established and
maintained for the administration of justice, and not to furnish a forum
chiefly for the exhibition of the skill of intellectual gladiators-sometimes
forgetful of the rights of the parties litigant to have justice administered."
The Supreme Court in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank 30
gave strong support to the view that Section 274 (b) allows inter-
pleader by answer. The court gave exhaustive consideration to an
interpleader proceeding under the statute, without the slightest sug-
gestion that Congress had not authorized such relief. The actual
holding was that the Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in treating
the controversy between the claimants in the second stage as a legal
proceeding not reviewable de novo. The court without dissent held
the interpleader to be equitable, though begun in an action at law.
Chief Justice Taft said of Section 274 (b) : 37
"This section applies to the case before us. The proceeding was changed
by defendant's- answer and cross-petition from one at law to one in equity,
and all the consequences flowing therefrom. The better practice would
perhaps have been, on the defendant's filing its answer and cross petition,
33. Hapai v. Brown, 239 U. S. 502, 506 (1916).
34. Dissenting in Keatley v. U. S. Trust Co., 249 Fed. 296, 299 (C. C. A.
2d, 1918).
35. Webb v. Southern Ry. Co., 235 Fed. 578, 593 (S. D. Ala. 1916).
36. Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, 260 U. S. '235 (1922). The
facts are stated Chafee, supra note 4, at 1139, 1140.
37. 260 U. S. 235, at 241-244.
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to order the cause transferred to the equity side of the court. ... Nor, by
the failure to order the transfer in this case, did the suit lose the equitable
character it had taken on by the answer and cross petition of the defendant.
The situation thus produced was quite like that under state civil codes of
procedure in which there is but one form of civil action, the formal dis-
tinction between proceedings in law and equity is abolished and remedies
at law and in equity are available to the parties in the same court and the
same cause.... Section 274 (b) is an important step toward a consolidation
of the federal courts of law and equity and the questions presented in this
union are to be solved much as they have been under the state codes....
To be sure, these sections do not create one form of civil action as do
the codes of procedure in the States, but they manifest a purpose on the
part of Congress to change from a suit at law to one in equity and the
reverse with as little delay and as little insistence on form as possible,
and are long steps toward code practice. Coming now to apply those two
sections thus construed to the case before us, we find that by defendant's
answer and the court's order it became a bill of interpleader in equity.
Thereafter the proceedings should have been so treated, both in the trial
and appellate courts. The chancellor having sustained a bill of interpleader,
disposed of the controversy between the claimants by directing any method
of trial which would best and expeditiously accomplish justice in the par-
ticular case.... This well established rule takes the issue here to be tried
out of that class of issues in which there must have been a jury trial under
the Seventh Amendment. Where it was one which the chancellor could
readily dispose of in one proceeding, it was in the interest of economy,
expedition and justice that he should do so."
It is true that no objection to the interpleader order of the district
court was raised on the briefs or, apparently, on the arguments of
counsel, but both the decision and the language of the Chief Justice
seem inconsistent with the view that interpleader by answer is im-
proper. If Section 274 (b) permits relief against the law plaintiff
alone, if it does not enable the court to join new parties, if the inter-
pleader prayer in the bank's answer should have been denied as soon
as it was made, then the Supreme Court was mostly wasting its time
in passing on this case. In view of the well-known reluctance of the
court to grant certiorari, it would be odd indeed if it chose to present
its views on the equitable nature of proceedings under Section 274 (b)
in a case outside the scope of that statute instead of waiting for a
proper occasion to arise. Since interpleader decisions in the Supreme
Court are rare-there have been none since 1922-it is to be hoped
that we shall not be required to wait for another decision in Wash-
ington, but that the Liberty Oil case will be taken as definitely settling
the propriety of interpleader by answer in actions at law.-
38. Several subsequent cases have so held: Brown v. Home Life Insurance
Co., supra note 19; Duell v. Greiner, 15 F. (2d) 726 (S. D. Fla. 1926) ; Kentucky
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Interpleader by answer can, of course, be obtained only in situations
where an original or ancillary bill would lie. Section 274 (b) is only
a procedural statute, which does not enlarge federal jurisdiction over
interpleader or remove any obstacles created by partial co-citizen-
ship. 9
One more question remains. If a stakeholder who has been sued
at law in a federal court may now interplead by answer in the law
action, is he thereby deprived of -the privilege of filing an original or
ancillary bill of interpleader on the equity side, on the ground that he
now has an adequate remedy at law? ° The correct answer seems in
the negative. He has a choice of interpleading by either answer or
bill. It has been repeatedly held that the English and state statutes
introducing interpleader at law do not bar interpleader in equity,
41
according to the well-settled principle that an established equitable
jurisdiction is not ousted by a statute conferring similar powers on
a law court. Even if it be considered that this principle is inapplica-
ble in the federal courts because of Section 16 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789,42 forbidding suits in equity "in any case where adequate and
complete remedy may be had at law," the answer remains the same.
Section 274 (b) does not give the stakeholder an adequate remedy at
law, because interpleader under it is not really a legal remedy. The
Liberty Oil case shows that it is an equitable remedy which happens
to be available in lawsuits. In short, the stakeholder now has two
remedies in equity, one by bill in equity as before, the other by answer
in the law action raising equitable issues which should properly be
transferred to the equity side of the court for trial.
Distilleries & Warehouse Co. .v. Louisville Public Warehouse Co., 19 F. (2d)
866 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927); Pearson v. Holden, 58 F. (2d) 1050 (D. Mass. 1932).
See the earlier case of U. S. ex rel. Morris v. Richardson, 233 Fed. 1010 (0. C.
A. 4th, 1915) cited in Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, mpra note 36,
at 242. But the contrary doctrine of the Shubert case, supra note 5, is still
followed in the Second Circuit: Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
supra note 3.
39. Learned Hand, J., Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co.,
238 Fed. 225, 228 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
40. This objection by the claimant to equitable jurisdiction was dismissed
in Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., 247 Fed. 256, 200;
Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 385, 388. The reason-
ing of the court did not follow that in the text, but was based on the inapplica-
bility of § 274 (b) to interpleader.
41. 2 AMES, CASES ON EQUITY (1904) 5On; MACLENNAN, INTEUPLEADER 17,
19; Crass v. Memphis & Charleston R. Co., 96 Ala. 447 (1892).
42. 1 STAT. 82 (1789), now 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1926).
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Iv
EQUITABLE REQUISITES FOR FEDERAL INTERPLEADER
Federal interpleader proceedings not brought under the Interpleader
Acts are, in accordance with the general statute on equity procedure,4A
governed by 'the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts
of equity" since no specific federal statute or rule of court prescribes
otherwise. The same principles apply in cases under those Acts, since
they are jurisdictional only, and effect no important change in the
substantive rights of the parties or in the equitable principles control-
ling interpleader.44 However, it must be remembered that these prin-
ciples of strict interpleader may be somewhat relaxed for bills in the
nature of interpleader, which may also be brought in federal equity
courts 5 Possibly only strict bills can be filed under the Interpleader
Acts, which may not mean to extend the privilege of service in dif-
ferent states to bills in the nature of interpleader. 4
The wider scope of federal interpleader for which this article argues
seems desirable because it would give the stakeholder much needed
protection without hurting anybody. The claimants too, usually gain
because their contentions are settled rapidly in a single proceeding,
and the victorious claimant finds the money or property to which he
is entitled already waiting for him in court instead of being obliged
to run down assets and levy execution. At the same time, equity is
careful to avoid situations where interpleader would cause undue
43. Supra note 22.
44. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Bondurant, 27 F. (2d) 464 (C. C. A. 6th,
1928); National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders, Chafee, supra note 4, quoted
at 1170, notes 123, 124.
45. Chafee, supra note 4, at 1138. Illustrations of such bills are: German
Savings Institution v. Adae, 8 Fed. 106 (C. C. Mo. 1880) (trust); Hayward
v. McDonald, 192 Fed. 890 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912) (trust and accounting); Knicher-
bocker Trust Co. v. Kalamazoo, 182 Fed. 865 (C. C. Mich. 1910) (lien); Groves
v. Sentell, 154 U. S. 465 (1894) (foreclosure of mortgage); Sherman National
Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., supra note 5 (lien and accounting); Fleming
v. Phoenix Assurance Co., supra note 12 (bill of peace with limited liability);
Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 3 (lien).
In the following cases the bill -was said by the court to be in the nature of
interpleader, but it is hard to find any independent equitable ground: Levinson
v. U. S., 258 U. S. 198 (1922); Thomas Kay Woolen Mill Co. v. Sprague, 259
Fed. 338 (D. Ore. 1919); McNamara v. Provident Savings Life Assurance
Society, 114 Fed. 910 (C. C. A. 5th, 1902). See also Royal Trust Co. v. Gar-
diner, 44 App. D. C. 570 (1916).
See also cases where the stakeholder was already a defendant in equity, cited
Chafee, supra note 4, note 56, par. 2.




hardship to one or both claimants, and for this purpose the remedy
has been surrounded by some essential safeguards, which are en-
forced in the United States courts as elsewhere.
4
First, the two claims must be mutually exclusive, must overlap.
Ordinarily this means that if one is right, the other must be wrong.
48
A man who owes $100 to his grocer and $100 to his bookseller can-
not interplead them merely because they claim the same sum. Very
likely he owes them both. In a proper interpleader case, on the other
hand-
"The very question to be decided is, where there is a sum of money or a
debt conceded to be due and two persons claim it, which of the two owns
or is entitled to it? This form of action necessarily implies that one is
and the other is not."
49
Second, if one of the two claims is clearly groundless, relief will
not be granted, for the stakeholder can without hazard ascertain
whether he owes the other claimant, and if he does may safely pay
him. 50  "He is, therefore, in no jeopardy from the conflicting
claims."61 "There must be a reasonable ground of uncertainty as to
which claimant is the one entitled." 52 "It is not enough that baseless
claims should be made against the stakeholder; they must not be void
on their face, or the bill will not lie." 53 In the same way, the Inter-
pleader Acts require that the claims be bona fide. 4 And the stake-
47. For a fuller review of these requisites, see Chafee, Modornizing Inter-
pleader (1923) 30 YALE L. J. 814, at 818-821.
48. Occasionally the two claims may each be partly right; but their aggre-
gate exceeds the total proper liability of the stakeholder, so that both cannot
be wholly right. This happens in mechanic's lien cases like National Sash and
Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930),
garnishment cises like Fleming v. Phoenix Assurance Co., supra note 12 and
other cases of limited liability. See Chafee, supra note 47, at 838.
49. Ray, J., Smith v. Mosier, 169 Fed. 430, 440 (C. C. N. Y., 1909); seo
also at 443. Absence of mutual exclusiveness was found in Pearson v. Holden,
.supra note 38; Standley v. Roberts, 59 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); and
Morgan v. Kraft, 285 Fed. 906 (App. D. C. 1922); but the last case, involving
claims for commissions by two real estate brokers, is questionable. Cf. similar
cases discussed in Chafee, supra note 47, 819.
50. Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U. S. 568 (1884); Pusey & Jones Co. v. Miller,
61 Fed. 401 (C. C. Del. 1894); Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
250 Fed. 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); Bank of Taiwan v. Gorgas Pierie Mfg. Co.,
273 Fed. 660 (C. C. A. 3d, 1921); Calloway v. Miles, 30 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A.
6th, 1929).
51. Killian v. Ebbinghaus, supra note 50, at 572.
52. Smith v. Mosier, supra note 49, at 442.
53. Kahn v. Garvan, 263 Fed. 909, at 915 (S. D. N. Y. 1920).
54. Chafee, supra note 4, note 91, and case cited.
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holder is also freed from the need for interpleader if legislation sup-
plies another satisfactory method of adjudicating the claims, or pro-
tects the stakeholder from further litigation after he has paid one
claimant.55 On the other hand, the rule that one of the claims must
not be baseless should not be applied too rigidly. The stakeholder
should not be obliged to set out affirmatively in his bill (or answer)
a reasonably strong case for each claimant, inasmuch as he is often
ignorant of the evidence and grounds upon which the claimants rely.
The interpleader should not be dismissed until it appears from the
face of the bill or from the testimony in the first stage that only one
claim has any foundation.5
0
Third, the stakeholder must show by affidavit, and if this be ques-
tioned, by proof, that he is not in collusion with either claimant.5T
Fourth, the money or property must be deposited in court to await
the outcome of the controversy between the claimants and be awarded
to the victor. This condition of relief is expressly required by the
Interpleader Acts, and cases thereunder insist upon its perform-
ance ;58 but probably it is sufficient in other federal interpleader pro-
ceedings to offer to hold the res at the disposition of the court, and
failure to do even this is sometimes excused especially in bills in the
nature of interpleader. 9
Fifth, the stakeholder must not have been placed in his precarious
position through his own fault or delay.,0  The courts should not,
however, be overready to find that the stakeholder is to blame for the
55. U. S. v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., rupra note 21; Kahn v. Garvan,
supra note 53.
56. See Chafee, supra note 47, 819n.; Blanton, J, Kingdom of Roumania
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 Fed. 195, 197 (S. D. N. Y., 1915).
57. Killian v. Ebbinghaus, m.pra note 50; see also Chafee, c.upra note 4,
note 91.
58. Chafee, -upra note 4, note 92; Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Hen-
derson, 244 Fed. 877 (N. D. Fla. 1917); Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Lush, supra note 46; Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Yaw, 53 F.
(2d) 684 (W. D. N. Y. 1931).
59. Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., aupra note 5; Marine
Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 3; Kentucky Distillerie3 &
Warehouse Co. v. Louisville Public Warehouse Co., supra note 38.
The statement in Uiion Pacific R. v. Belek, 211 Fed. 699 (C. C. Neb. 1913)
that even though no claimant proves his case, the deposit in court cannot be
returned to the stakeholder, is questionable. Contra: Keener v. Grand Lodge,
38 Mo. App. 543 (1889).
60. Mallory S. S. Co. v. Thalheim, 277 Fed. 196 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921); Shepard,
C. J., dissenting in Royal Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 44 App. D. C. 570, 577, at 584
(1916); Calloway v. Miles, supra note 50; Royal Neighbors v. Lowary, 46 F.
(2d) 565 (D. Mont. 1931). Delay may simply result in a denial of counsel
fees, infra, note 69.
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double vexation. Fortunately, the federal cases show little tendency
toward the harshness displayed on this point in some other juris-
dictions.01 Certainly a technical liability to one claimant for con-
version ought not to bar relief. And Judge Mack points out that the
contention that the stakeholder is a wrongdoer sometimes begs the
very question in issue.02
In proceedings under the federal Interpleader Acts an additional
safeguard 'may perhaps need to be imposed by the courts, to prevent
occasional injustice to a claimant who resides far from the place of
suit. Suppose that one claimant resides in Massachusetts and the
other in California, and that interpleader is brought, as the 1926 Act
permits, in the, Massachusetts district court. It is hard on the Cali-
fornian to be forced to join in litigation in Massachusetts. Ordinarily
this is no objection to the venue, because it would be equally hard on
the Massachusetts claimant to interplead in California. But there
may be circumstances which make the burden of distant litigation
far heavier on the Californian claimant than on the other, and then
the Massachusetts district court might well exercise discretion in
refusing to take jurisdiction, and tell the stakeholder to file a new
bill in California. Congress has made a partial attempt to cover
such a situation in insurance cases by trying to give a preferential
venue to the district of the beneficiary, who is perhaps less able to
litigate at h distance than an assignee, but this venue provision has
amounted to very little in the courts.0 3 An insurance company seems
able to file its bill wherever any claimant resides, and such a free
choice is certainly possessed by surety companies. This question will
become still more important if the Interpleader Act is amended, in
accordance with the proposals now before Congress,04 so as to give
relief to other classes of stakeholders who badly need it. In that
event the statute will naturally give such added stakeholders a free
choice of venue, but it will still be desirable that the district court
where interpleader is filed should have discretion to dismiss -the suit
when great inconvenience would be caused to a distant claimant.
Under such circumstances the stakeholder would be told to file his
61. MACLENNAN, INTERPLEADER 60, 61.
62. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 3.
63. Chafee, supra note 4, note 94.
64. H. R. 16335 introduced January 19, 1931, by Representative Thatcher
of Kentucky (74 Cong. Rec. 2628, 1931), and S. 2216 introduced December 17,
1931, by Senator Barkley of Kentucky, (75 Cong. Rec. 670, 1931), allow "any
person, firm, corporation, association, or society" to have interpleader under
specified conditions and provide that the action may be instituted "in a district
in which one or more of such claimants resides." The venue provision of the
1926 Act is omitted.
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bill in the district of such claimant. It would be even better if the
court where suit was first brought could avoid the inconvenience to
the stakeholder of starting anew, and could transfer the whole case to
the appropriate district. However, such a convenient practice would
require legislation looking toward the unification of our system of
United States district courts, which is not likely to be enacted for
some time to come.
In addition to the safeguards protecting claimants from injustice,
the federal courts have applied a few other equitable principles es-
tablished in interpleader actions elsewhere. The most important is
the right of the applicant to obtain his costs and counsel fees from
the funds deposited in court. This has been commonly recognized
in federal interpleader suits not brought under the Interpleader
Acts.65 However, this privilege has been denied to an interested
stakeholder who was allowed to file a bill in the nature of inter-
pleader.6 6 The Interpleader Act of 1917 expressly allowed the stake-
holder only his actual court costs, which did not include counsel fees. 7
The omission of this provision in the 1925 and 1926 Acts, coupled
with the authorization of suitable and proper orders and decrees,
left the courts free to follow the usual equitable practice and allow
counsel fees, as they have done in several subsequent decisions.02
On the other hand, a stakeholder who had unreasonably delayed in
seeking interpleader under these statutes has been denied counsel
fees.69
65. Thomas Kay Woolen Mill Co. v. Sprague, supra note 45; Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. F. & M. National Bank, 173 Fed. 390 (C. C. Ohio 1909); Penn
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co., 83 Fed. 891 (C. C. Cal. 1897);
McNamara v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, supra note 45; Mutual
Life Insurance Company v. Lane, 151 Fed. 276 (C. C. Ga. 1907); City Bank
v. Skelton, supra note 9; Louisiana State Lottery Co. v. Clark, 16 Fed. 20
(C. C. La. 1883); Caten v. Eagle Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 19. Conira:
Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Sailor, 47 F. (2d) 911 (S. D. Cal. 1930),
applying California statute. Cf. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co. v.
Louisville Public Warehouse Co., supra note 38.
66. Knickerbocker Trust Co. v. Kalamazoo; Groves v. Sentell, both cupra note
45.
67. Chafee, supra note 4, note 93. See Guardian Life Insurance Co. v.
Rosenbaum, 280 Fed. 861 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922); New York Life Insurance Co.
v. Bidoggia, 15 F. (2d) 126 (D. Idaho 1926).
68. Terry v. Supreme Forest, 21 F. (2d) 158 (D. Tenn. 1926); Ackerman
v. Tobin, 22 F. (2d) 541 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927); Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Bondurant, supra note 44; Allen v. Hudson, 35 F. (2d) 330 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929);
Globe and Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown, 52 F. (2d) 165 (D. La. 1931).
69. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Bidoggia, supra note 67; Royal Neigh-
bors v. Lowary, supra note 60.
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In the. second stage of the interpleader, the burden of proof is
rested on the claimant who would bear it if an ordinary action had
been started by one claimant against another.70 Questions of gen-
eral law which arise in this stage are governed by the pertinent
federal rule and not by the decisions of the courts of the particular
state.7 1 When two claimants have been interpleaded, a third claim-
ant who is interested in the controversy but who was not made a
party to the original bill, has been allowed to intervene.1 2
Although claimants are adequately protected by the safeguards
already considered, many state courts have added four technical
limitations upon interpleader (given classic form by Pomeroy7a),
which greatly hamper the operation of this remedy. Fortunately,
these limitations have had very little influence upon the federal courts.
1. Pomeroy's first requisite, that the claimants must claim the
same debt, duty, or thing, has been imposed to prevent relief in
only one federal case, 74 and this decision may be rested on want of
mutual exclusiveness. Relief has been granted although the claims
were for different sums of money 7 or even for different things.70
2. Privity has prevented interpleader only in one old case.71 Con-
trary to rigid views, interpleader has been granted to a bailee against
his bailor and a stranger ;78 to a bank against the holder of a certificate
of a deposit and a person who asserted that the deposited money was
70. Penn. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Union Trust Co., supra note 65;
Buck v. Mason, 135 Fed. 304 (C. C. A. 5th, 1905). See Chafee, supra note 47,
at 831, n. 63.
71. Kansas City Life Insurance Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 712 (N. D. Tex.
1928).
72. Holt v. Russell, 30 F. (2d) 597 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929); Federal Cement
Co. v. Shaffer, 235 Fed. 912 (E. D. Pa. 1916). See MACLDNNAN, INTERPLIADM
115. Contra: Michigan & Ohio Plaster Co. v. White, 44 Mich. 25 (1880). Cf.
American Surety Co. v. Calcasieu Oil Co., 58 F. (2d) 1039 (W. D. La. 1932).
73. PomEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1919) § 1322. See Chafee,
supra note 47, 821 f. The four requisites are stated in Wells, Fargo & Co.
v. Miner, supra note 21, and Ross v. International Life Insurance Co., supra
note 15, both granting interpleader.
74. Pearson v. Holden, supra note 38. Want of the same debt, duty or thing
was said to bar relief in two cases arising from a territory and the District
of Columbia. Standley v. Roberts; Morgan v. Kraft, both discussed supra note 49.
75. Heinemann v. Heinemann, 50 F. (2d) 696 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931); Hay-
ward v. McDonald, 192 Fed. 890 (C. C. A. 5th, 1912), see Chafee, supra note 3,
note 36 (bill in nature of interpleader).
76. Pacifio Bank v. Mixter, 124 U. S. 721 (1888) (securities and money);
Caten v. Eagle Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, supra note 19 (stock and money).
77. Bartlett v. The Sultan, 23 Fed. 257 (C. C. N. Y. 1885).
78. City Bank v. Skelton, supra note 9; Marine lMidland Trust Co. v. Irving
Trust Co., quoted infra, note 94.
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obtained by fraud;79 to a corporation against the legatees of stock
and the purchaser at a sale conducted on behalf of the guardian of
the decedent to pay guardianship expenses.80
3. The stakeholder's interest in the subject matter of contro-
versy has played a larger part in federal cases than the other tech-
nical requisites. A liberal view would make this only a factor going
to the discretion of the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and
this view is occasionally taken where the interest arises from a small
charge for freight, commissions, etc.81 * When the charge is clearly
valid, it should certainly be no bar to relief, and this principle was
applied in a federal case where the stakeholder was a life insurance
company entitled to deduct unpaid premiums from the money de-
posited in court.8 2  The interest becomes more serious when the
stakeholder is virtually identified with one claimant,83 or when he
disputes the extent of his liability and fails to deposit the amount
possibly due to one or more claimants. Such a failure, besides show-
ing interest, violates the reasonable safeguard of a deposit of the
r'es in court, already discussed, which is expressly required by the
Interpleader Acts. Consequently, relief was refused in two cases
under these Acts. 4 These are the only decisions arising in circuit
or district courts which made interest a bar. In bills in the nature
of interpleader, on the other hand, interest does not prevent relief
to the stakeholder.85 The flexible procedure in such bills permits
him to dispute the amount of his liability, which can be settled before
the second stage begins between the claimants;80 and he may even
claim a large lien upon the fund in controversy or otherwise partici-
pate in the second stage.87 Any legal issues as to the amount of his
liability, etc., can be settled by a jury before or after the second
stage.88
79. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Miner, supra note 21.
80. Thomas Kay Woolen Co. v. Sprague, supra note 45.
81. See cases cited in Chafee, supra note 47, 840 f.
82. McNamara v. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society, supra note 45.
83. Killian v. Ebbinghaus, supra note 50.
84. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Lush; Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co. v. Yaw; both supra note 58.
85. Levinson v. U. S., supra note 45.
86. Hayward v. McDonald, supra note 75; Mundy v. Louisville & Nashville
R. R., 67 Fed. 633 (C. C. A. 6th, 1895).
87. Provident Savings Life Assurance Society v. Loeb, 115 Fed. 357 (C. C.
La. 1901); Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co., supra note 5;
Marine Midland Trust Co., v. Irving Trust Co., supra note 3. See also Knicker-
bocker Trust Co. v. Kalamazoo, supra note 45; Federal Mining Co. v. Bunker
Hill Mining Co., supra note 9; Chafee, supra note 47, at 841.
88. Learned Hand, J., Sherman National Bank v. Shubert Theatrical Co.,
238 Fed. 225, at 230, 231; Woolsey, J., Irving Trust Co. v. Marine Midland Trust
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4. Possible independent liability to one claimant, in addition to
double vexation about the res, prevented interpleader in only one fed-
eral case, where an insurance company had a special agreement with
a beneficiary in connection with her paying the premiums ;", but this
decision was questioned in another circuit.90 Independent liability
was held to be no bar in another case.9 1 The courts called this a
bill in the nature of interpleader, although the independent equit-
able ground necessary for such bills was not specifically pointed out.
This illustrates the readiness of many courts to avoid Pomeroy's
technical requisites by readily transforming the proceedings into a
bill in the nature of interpleader.92
That these technical requisites should be discarded, even for strict
bills, has been argued in an earlier article.93 This view is supported
by the vigorous language of Judge Mack in a very recent federal
case on interpleader:
94
"I do not deem the kind of 'privity' originally held essential to an inter-
pleader or to a bill in the nature of interpleader, to be required for the
maintenance of such a bill. That one is subject to two or more judgments
and thus to double or greater liability, if and when but one obligation has
been entered into, suffices. Likewise, in absence of an estoppel or of inde-
pendent obligations entered into in respect of property, conflicting claims
to the same piece of property, each of which might be sustained when in
justice the possessor, should be subject to but one claim, justifies such a
bill."
V
LIBERALIZATION OF EQUITABLE REQUISITES BY LEGISLATION AND
RULES OF COURT
A. State Legislation
Although privity and the other technical requisites have not proved
a serious obstacle to interpleader in the United States courts, they
still cause trouble in some cases, and it would be desirable if they
were definitely abolished. Statutes modifying these requisites have
Co., 47 F. (2d) 907, at 908. Accord: Aleck v. Jackson, 49 N. . Eq. 507, 23
Atl. 760 (1892).
89. Calloway v. Miles, supra note 50.
90. National Fire Insurance Co. v. Sanders, supra note 15.
91. Levinson v. U. S., supra note 45. Possibly the independent equitablo
ground here was mistake.
92. See Chafee, supra note 47, at 839.
93. Chafee, supra note 47.
94. Marine Midland Trust Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 56 F. (2d) 385, 387 (S.
D. N. Y. 1932).
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been enacted in Massachusetts, New York, and states adopting the
California code of civil procedure.05 The Uniform Bills of Lading
Act and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act contain sections au-
thorizing interpleader, which have been held to abolish the requisites
of privity and want of independent liability. 0 The provision of the
California code was held applicable to a federal interpleader suit in
that state,97 and a similar position has been less decisively taken in
a few other cases.98 Whether most federal courts would follow these
cases and hold a state statute abolishing privity applicable in the
United States courts is a very difficult question. The Supreme Court,
in Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen,99 distinguishes between substantive
equitable rights created by a state statute, which will be enforced
by the federal equity courts in the state, and remedial statutes which
are said not to enlarge or narrow the federal equity jurisdiction or
alter federal equity procedure, because by Act of Congress'00 this
procedure is governed by general equitable principles and by federal
statutes or rules of court. This distinction is not very helpful. It
is hard to predict what will be considered a substantive right and
what a remedy, and in which class a statute lies which widens the
scope of interpleader. Strictly, this should be classed as remedial,
since it does not alter the tort or contract rights of the claimants
against the stakeholder or create any new defenses for him, but sim-
ply enables him to deal with the claims in one equity suit instead of
two lawsuits. However, the same remedial character seems to at-
tach to a state statute providing that a deed, void on its face, shall
be deemed a cloud on title, and such a statute will undoubtedly be
95. Chafee, supra note 47, at 839, 840.
96. Id. at 840, notes 13, 14.
97. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Miner, supra note 21.
98. Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 244 Fed. 195, 197 (S. D. N.
Y. 1917) (New York code does not require stakeholder to establish validity of ad-
verse claims); National Sash & Door Co. v. Continental Casualty Co., 37 F. (2d)
342 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930) (Louisiana concursus statute); Continental Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Sailor, supra note 65 (stakeholder denied counsel fees under California
code).
99. 261 U. S. 491 (1923). Accord: Mathews v. Rodgers, 52 Sup. CL 217,
221 (1932). Many cases on the application of state statutes to the federal equity
courts are collected in Note (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 688. See also Note (1923)
33 YALE L. J. 193; Note (1923) 22 MIcH. L. REv. 834; Note (1903) 3 COL. L.
REv. 47; Collier, Limitations on Federal Courts in Administcring State Law
(1912) 75 CENT. L. J. 330; Note (1915) 3 VA. L. REV. 227; Keller, Jurisdiction
of the Federal Equity Courts as Affected by State Statute& (1912) 47 Air. L.
Rnv. 190.
100. REv. STAT. § 913 (1875); 28 U. S. C. § 723 (1926).
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enforced by the federal courts. 10 1 Here too the substantive law is
not changed-the statute does not make void an instrument which
was previously valid. It merely enables the rightful owner to get
equitable relief, whereas previously he had to wait until he was sued
in ejectment at law before he could establish the invalidity of the
deed. Both the interpleader and the cloud statutes authorize a man
to start an equitable suit to protect the substantive rights which
previously he could maintain only as defendant in a law court. Evi-
dently some remedial rights created by state statutes have sufficient
solidity to be recognized in the federal courts. The line between pro-
cedure and substantive law shows signs of breaking down and the
terms may in fact be little more than descriptions of two different
judicial attitudes toward an issue.
10 2
Therefore it is more profitable to consider whether a state statute
abolishing privity in interpleader arouses any of the strong specific
objections which the federal equity courts raise against applying
state statutes. This statute does not attempt a thoroughgoing fusion
of law and equity, and it does not give equitable relief to a person
with an adequate remedy at law, 10 3 for the stakeholder's only satis-
factory protection against double vexation lies in equity. It does
not deprive the claimants of any constitutional right to a jury trial
but merely removes from interpleader an excrescence which began to
infect it after 1789.104 The statute is not procedural in a narrow
sense. It does not regulate the conduct of the interpleader in the
equity court or give the stakeholder a little different way of getting
into equity.10 5 It opens the doors of the equity court to a person who
otherwise might not be able to enter at all because of the want of
privity. In this way it differs from the Delaware statute allowing
a simple contract creditor to obtain a receivership, which was held
inapplicable to the federal courts in Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen.100
There the creditor could have got into equity later, after he had
reduced his claim to judgment; the statute merely accelerates the
101. Reynolds v. Crawfordsville First National Bank, 112 U. S. 405 (1884);
Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra note 99, at 499.
102. See Arnold. The Role of Substantive Law and Procedure in the Legal
Process (1932) 45 HARV. L. Ray. 617.
103. Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U. S. 146 (1891).
104. The first case clearly expressing the doctrine was in 1829. Chafes,
supra note 47, at 829, n. 53.
105. In this way the California statute abolishing privity differs from the
statutes allowing interpleader in a law action considered supra under liA.
A state statute denying the stakeholder counsel fees might be considered only
a regulation of equitable relief, so that Continental Life Insurance Co. v. Sailor,
supra note 65, is somewhat open to question.
106. Supra, note 99.
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time for equitable relief. The privity doctrine denies such relief
altogether. Finally, a statute slightly widening the opportunities
for interpleader does not threaten to overwhelm the federal courts
with a great mass of unwelcome litigation. This practical factor
probably had considerable influence upon the unwillingness of the
Supreme Court to increase federal receiverships. The statutory
abolition of privity merely enables a stakeholder to obtain a just
relief from double vexation in a few cases without any additional
burden to the other parties or to the court.
In the present confused state of the federal decisions on the ap-
plicability of state statutes, which at best are not very common, a
more satisfactory relief from the imposition of technical requisites
upon federal interpleader can be given by federal legislation and
rules of courts.
B. Federal Legislation and Rules of Court
There is no existing federal legislation affecting the technical
requisites of interpleader except the Uniform Bills of Lading Act,
which has not yet proved important in this connection. °'0  The only
federal case under this statute denied relief for other reasons than
privity 08 The Interpleader Acts make no provision on this point,
but fortunately they have been applied with very little difficulty. In
practically every case the first stage was concluded almost auto-
matically, and the litigation resolved itself at once into a contest
between the claimants. However, if the 1926 Act is amended, it
would be desirable to remove all doubts about these technical re-
quisites, especially privity, by the insertion of a clause like that in the
California code of civil procedure or the English phraseology set forth
in the next paragraph. 0 9 At the same time, Congress could expressly
allow interpleader under this Act in actions at law, as is already
possible under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, thus clearing up
doubts about the meaning of Section 274 (b) of the Judicial Code.
Another way to abolish the technical requisites would be by an
amendment to the Federal Equity Rules. A new rule on interpleader
would have the advantage of applying, not only to suits under the
Interpleader Act, but also to suits outside its scope, which are likely
to remain important unless the benefit of the Act should be extended
to all kinds of stakeholders. This is the method pursued in England,
where the technical requisites formerly hampering interpleader in
107. 39 STAT. 541 (1916), 49 U. S. C. §§ 97, 98 (1926). See &pra, notes
17, 96.
108. Mallory S. S. Co. v. Thalhein, supra note 60.
109. Infra, note 110.
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equity have been almost entirely wiped out by Order LVII of the
Supreme Court.110 Privity is'expressly abolished, interest liberalized,
and independent liability held to be no longer fatal."' This Order
was adopted under the rule-making power conferred by the Judica-
ture Act.11 2  The rule-making power of the Supreme Court of the
United States in suits in equity'1 3 seems sufficiently broad to authorize
it to promulgate a similar rule. Also, since proceedings under Section
274 (b) of the Judicial Code are equitable, as decided in Liberty Oil
Co. v. Condon National Bank," 4 the Supreme Court can perhaps pro-
vide in the Federal Equity Rules for interpleader by the defendant
in an action at law.
CONCLUSIONS
Federal interpleader apart from the Interpleader Acts is somewhat
hampered by the difficulties caused by absence of complete diversity
of citizenship, unless these are removed by the ancillary jurisdiction,
and also by the possible lack of power to enjoin pending state suits
against the stakeholder. Relief under the Interpleader Acts is more
easily obtainable by stakeholders within the scope of that legislation,
and pending state suits can now be enjoined thereunder. Interpleader
110. THn ANNUAL PRACTICE (1930) 1189. This Order reads in part as
follows:
"1. Relief by way of interpleader may be granted,
(a) Where the person seeking relief (called the applicant) in this order
is under liability for any debt, money, goods, or chattels, for or in respect
of which he is, or expects to be, sued by two or more parties (in this order
called the claimants) making adverse claims thereto: ...
2. The applicant must satisfy the court or a judge by affidavit or otherwise,-
(a) That the applicant claims no interest in the subject-matter in dis-
pute, other than for charge or costs; and (b) that the applicant does not collude
with any of the claimants; and (c) that the applicant . . . is willing to pay
or transfer the subject-matter into court or to dispose of it as the court or
a judge may direct.
3. The applicant shall not be disentitled to relief by reason only that the
titles of the claimants have not a common origin, but are adverse to and inde-
pendent of one another.
4. Where the applicant is a defendant, application for relief may be made
at any time after service of the writ of summons."
111. In re Mersey Docks and Harbour Board, 1 Q. B. 546 [C. A. 1899).
But the same debt, duty, or thing test was applied to bar relief in Sun Insurance
Office v. Galinsky, 2 K. B. 545 [C. A. 1914]; contra, federal cases cited supra,
notes 75, 76.
112. (1873) 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, § 74.
113. 1 STAT. 93 (1789), 28 U. S. C. § 723, (1926); 5 STAT. 518 (1842), 28
U. S. C. § 730 (1926).
114. Supra note 36.
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in actions at law is probably not available under state statutes, but
is expressly allowed by the federal Bills of Lading Act and seems
possible under Section 274 (b) of the Judicial Code. The federal
courts have shown little inclination to bar relief by technical re-
quisites, especially under the Interpleader Acts. It is possible, but
not certain, that state statutes abolishing such requisites are ap-
plicable to federal interpleader.
It is desirable that the law relating to federal interpleader should
be clarified or liberalized on four important points. First, the Inter-
pleader Acts should be extended to give relief to additional types of
stakeholders who are subjected to double vexation by claimants re-
siding in different states, such as railroads, warehouses, and banks.
Secondly, the statute forbidding injunctions of pending state suits
should be amended to permit such injunctions in federal interpleader
suits outside the present scope of the Interpleader Acts. Thirdly, it
should be made certain by legislation or a Federal Equity Rule that
a defendant in an action at law may interplead by answer. Fourthly,
the technical requisites for interpleader should be definitely abolished
by legislation or a new Federal Equity Rule.
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